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"THE TENDER BALANCE"
DYNAMICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA v.
CTS CORPORATION
794 F.2D 250 (7TH CIR. 1986), REV'D,
55 U.S.L.W. 4478 (APR. 21, 1987)1
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960's, cash tender offers became a highly publicized
method of gaining corporate control. Unlike traditional proxy solicita-
tions or exchange offers, cash tender offers were generally unregulated
until Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968.2 Subsequent to the
enactment of the Williams Act, a number of states adopted their own
tender offer regulations that were designed to expand on both the proce-
dural and substantive provisions of the Williams Act.3  Recently, Dy-
namics Corp. of America (DCA) challenged the new Indiana tender offer
statute, The Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter.4 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp. 5 found that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional on both
Supremacy and Commerce Clause grounds.
Part I of this comment will review the historical background of fed-
eral and state regulation of tender offers. Part II will examine the facts of
Dynamics and describe the court's reasoning. Part III will analyze the
court's decision and Part IV will discuss wealth maximization as a theory
of investor protection. This comment will conclude by suggesting that
Congress preempt state regulation of tender offers.
I. As this comment was being printed, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's
holding. However, the Seventh Circuit's decision in this case presents an interesting illustration of
how economic theory pervades much of Judge Posner's legal analysis. As noted above, Part IV will
discuss how the theory of wealth maximization may explain the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Dynamics. The Supreme Court's opinion will be briefly discussed in the Appendix.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (1982). The Williams Act was an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n (a)-(c) (1982). This conclusion, of course is weakened by
the Supreme Court's reversal of the Seventh Circuit. However, it may be that the recent disclosure
of massive insider trading on Wall Street put the Court in a more deferential mood vis-a-vis state
regulation of tender offers.
3. These statutes fell under the rubric of "first generation" takeover regulations. For a com-
plete listing, see Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 7 J. CORP. L. 603, 603 n.2 (1982).
4. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986).
5. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4478 (Apr. 21, 1987).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the 1960's, corporate takeover attempts had typically in-
volved either proxy solicitations6 or exchange offers of securities. 7 Both
processes, however, were and still are very time consuming, requiring as
long as three to four months to complete. In the meantime, the target
corporation remains vulnerable to takeover attempts by other would-be
acquirers. 8 In response to the time delays inherent in both proxy solicita-
tions and exchange offers, cash tender offers evolved as an alternative
method of gaining corporate control. 9 Since tender offers were generally
unregulated, 10 potential suitors were able to consummate their offers
with greater speed and with less cost than if they had chosen to gain
control by means of a proxy solicitation or exchange offer."1
By 1968 a perception was developing that the average investor was
not being provided with adequate information or time to formulate an
intelligent investment decision in response to a tender offer. 12 Congress
responded by enacting the Williams Act13 which mandated that the of-
6. Proxy solicitations involved an attempt by either outsiders or shareholders to effect changes
in the management or operations of the firm. This is done by gaining the voting power of the other
shareholders by means of a written authorization given by a shareholder to someone else for the
purpose of representing him and voting his shares at a shareholder's meeting. Proxy solicitations are
regulated under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n (a)-(c) (1982) [hereinafter
1934 Act].
7. An exchange offer involves the trading of two companies shares for each other, e.g., Com-
pany ABC offers 1/2 share of class I ABC preferred and 1/2 share of ABC Common in exchange for
one share of XYZ Common. Exchange offers, unless exempted, are subject to regulation under the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa(1982) [hereinafter Act of 1933].
8. See Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisitions Market-
place, 13 INST. ON SEC. REG. 13, 15-16 (1981).
9. The Williams Act does not define "tender offer" and its meaning remains unsettled. How-
ever, it is generally regarded as an invitation, publicly made to all shareholders of a corporation, to
sell their shares at a specified price. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G BERLSTEIN,
DEVELOPMENT IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1 (1977).
10. For example, prior to 1968 the only avenue available to a company or shareholder seeking
to restrain a tender offer was to bring suit under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976);
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-5 (1977). Specifically, rules
lOb-6 and 10b-13 are designed to prevent the offering company from making separate deals with
holders of large blocks of target stock and from dealing in its own shares of target stock so as to
manipulate the price of target shares. B. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, 13A.
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 27.05[4] (1986).
11. See 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (tender offer is "cheaper and
faster than proxy solicitation"), cited in Note, Target Defensive Tactics As Manipulative Under Sec-
tion 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 228, 228 n.3 (1984). A further advantage of the tender offer is that it
robs the target company's management of time to prepare defenses against the offer. For a general
discussion of the various defensive techniques which have been raised by target companies to defeat
tender offers, see Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and To-
day's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29, 44-63 (Nov. 1986).
12. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 550].
13. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 12-14, 16; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1964) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f)
(1982)).
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feror provide investors full and fair disclosure of the offer's terms. The
Act also gave the offeror and target management an equal opportunity to
present their respective cases.14 Congress, however, was careful not to
favor either target management or the offeror by tipping the balance of
regulation in either direction.15
The procedural provisions of the Williams Act require that the
tender offeror file a disclosure statement with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission if, after the offer, the maker would own more than
five percent of a particular class of equity securities. 16 This statement,
known as a schedule 14D-1, requires the offeror to provide the share-
holders of the target company with all material information contained in
the offer. 17 In addition to the procedural requirements, the Williams Act
also contains four substantive provisions. These provisions: (1) allow a
shareholder to withdraw tendered shares any time within seven days af-
ter publication of the offer or sixty days from the date of tender if the
offeror has not purchased them; 18 (2) provide for pro rata acceptance of
oversubscribed offers; 19 (3) provide for equal treatment of all selling
14. See generally S. REP. No. 550, supra note 12.
15. See Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western,
53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 872, 876 (1978). Further support for the conclusion that Congress meant for the
Williams Act to be neutral as between target management and the offeror may be derived from early
drafts of the Act which were decidedly pro-management. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (Court discusses legislative history of the Act) and comments made by Manuel
Cohen, then Chairman of the SEC, "[Tihe principal point is that we are not concerned with assisting
or hurting either side. We are concerned with the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of
industrial warfare .... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle." Full Disclosure of Corporation
Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967) (state-
ment of Manuel Cohen, Chairman, SEC), quoted in Piper, 430 U.S. at 27-28 (1977).
16. 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 24, 284C, at 17,735-38 (1986). The required information on
schedule 14D-1 is as follows: (1) target company and security sought; (2) identity and background
of the purchaser; (3) pass contracts, transactions, and negotiations with the target company;
(4) source and amount of funds used in the purchase; (5) the purpose of the transaction including
any plans to liquidate, sell the assets of, merge, change the boards of directors or management of, or
make any material changes in the business or corporate structure of the target; (6) the number of
shares the offeror, associates, and majority-owned subsidiaries own or have a right to acquire; (7) in-
formation as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with respect to the securities; (8) the
identity and terms of employment of all persons retained to make solicitations or recommendations;
(9) financial statements of the offeror, other than natural persons, when material to a securi-
tyholder's decision whether to tender; (10) such additional information as is material to a securi-
tyholder's decision; and (11) solicitation materials used in the tender offer.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1986).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). This gives the investor time to change his mind. The Act
provides that tendered securities may be withdrawn until the expiration of seven days after the time
definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to security
holders, and at any time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or
invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). Pro rata acceptance is necessary where the offer is made for
fewer than all shares of a particular class. The effect of this provision is to avoid any need on the
part of a shareholder to make a quick decision.
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shareholders;20 and (4) impose affirmative duties on the offeror to prevent
any false or misleading statements as well as fraudulent or manipulative
acts.2
1
Despite these procedural and substantive provisions of the Williams
Act, a number of business executives believed that the Act had not gone
far enough in providing investors with sufficient protection against what
they believed were corporate raiders. 22 Consequently, these local busi-
ness executives exerted pressure on their state legislators to remedy what
they considered to be a gap in investor protection. Many states re-
sponded by enacting their own form of tender offer regulations. 23 In
some cases, the new state regulations merely expanded on the procedural
provisions of the Williams Act by imposing greater disclosure rules or by
requiring the offeror to notify both state authorities and target manage-
ment before commencing a tender offer.24 Others, though, imposed
stricter substantive provisions than those provided for by the Act. For
example, some of the state statutes mandated longer withdrawal periods
or extended the proration period for the duration of the offer.25 On their
face, many of the stricter procedural and substantive provisions enacted
by the states were designed to provide shareholders with increased time
for making a decision. Thus, it was argued that the state regulations
added to the protections offered by the Williams Act. 26 Some, however,
were designed to protect in-state management from the threat of a
takeover.
27
Regardless of their purpose, critics of these state regulations con-
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). In some cases, an offering company may find it necessary to
increase its offering price. Some shareholders, however, may have already tendered their shares.
§ 78n(d)(7) insures that early tenderers will have the advantage of any later offer increase.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
22. In fact, many of the state statutes which were enacted were originally sponsored by local
companies. Bartell, The Wisconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1466 (1977) (Special Is-
sue). See also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 172
(1973).
23. See supra note 3.
24. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.2(5) (1977) (10 day notice required before commenc-
ing); Illinois Business Takeover Act § 4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.54(E) (1981) (repealed
1983) (20 days). In contrast, the Williams Act requires only that the tender offeror file its disclosure
statement on the day commencement of the offer begins. Other state procedural provisions imposed
greater disclosure requirements than required by the Act. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-6-2 (re-
pealed 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-2(b)(3) (Repl. 1986).
25. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.010(2) (1986) (21 day withdrawal right); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203(a)(2)(1983) (20 days). For those extending the proration period for the duration of the
offer, see e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 10C, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-2-80(4) (Law. Co-op 1985).
26. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Track, 83
MICH. L. REV. 433, 439 (1984).
27. See, e.g., 1976 Ky. Acts 534 (prevention of takeover bids). This statute was held unconsti-
tutional by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Esmark v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1982).
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tend, the state statutes delay effectiveness of the tender offer, thereby
making it easier for target management to defeat an unwanted tender
offer. 28 In the critics' view, statutes that create delay tip the scale of
regulation in favor of target management and are contrary to the Wil-
liams Act which attempts to maintain a neutral balance between tender
offeror and target management.
29
The courts have generally agreed with the critics. In particular, the
courts have found that state regulation of tender offers is either pre-
empted by the Williams Act or that such regulations impermissibly bur-
den interstate commerce. For example, in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,30 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held unconstitu-
tional an Idaho statute which required any person making a tender offer
for an Idaho company to file a registration statement with, and be de-
clared effective by, the state's department of finance before commencing
the tender offer. 31 The Fifth Circuit found that the Idaho statute was
unconstitutional on supremacy clause grounds because it upset the neu-
trality struck by the Williams Act between tender offeror and the target
management and was therefore preempted by the Act. The court also
found that the Idaho statute violated the commerce clause because it im-
permissibly burdened interstate commerce by interfacing with "security
transactions all over the country. '3 2 Consequently, the Idaho statute
was held unconstitutional on both supremacy and commerce clause
grounds.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit declared the Illinois Business Take-
over Act 33 unconstitutional in MITE v. Dixon 34 on commerce clause
grounds. Especially troublesome to the Seventh Circuit in MITE was the
fact that the Illinois Act authorized the Secretary of State to pass on the
"fairness" of the offer, blocking those which he deemed "unfair. 35 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's finding. Justice White,
writing for a majority of the Court held that the Illinois Act was uncon-
28. See Note, supra note 26, at 439.
29. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV.
767, 768 (1971); Langevart, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Compe-
tency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 240 (1977); Maylon, State Regulations of Tender Offerors, 58
MARQ. L. REV. 687, 690 (1975); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and
Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18 (1976); but c.f Arsht, The Delaware Takeover
Statute-Special Problems for Directors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1972).
30. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. LeRoy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
31. 577 F.2d at 1274-86.
32. Id. at 1279, 1286.
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
34. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub. nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1981).
35. 457 U.S. at 627.
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stitutional because it imposed excessive burdens on interstate commerce
in relation to the local interests served by the statute.3 6 The Court
pointed out that under the Illinois Act, the Secretary had the power to
block a nationwide tender offer for the purpose of protecting local inves-
tors. While concluding that Illinois may have had a legitimate interest in
protecting local investors, it clearly did not have such an interest in pro-
tecting non-resident shareholders.
37
A plurality of the Court also found that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act. The plurality reasoned that the hearing
provisions of the Illinois Act frustrated congressional purpose by intro-
ducing extended delay into the tender offer process.38 Justice White
noted that the target company could use these hearing provisions as a
"powerful weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover. In enacting the Wil-
liams Act, Congress itself recognized that delay can seriously impede a
tender offer and sought to avoid it.''39 Consequently, Justice White
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have ruled
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act. However, Jus-
tice White's preemption analysis was expressly rejected by Justices Pow-
ell and Stevens. They noted that Congress' decision to follow a policy of
neutrality was not necessarily "tantamount to a federal prohibition
against state legislation designed to provide special protection to incum-
bent management." 4
Several states responded to the MITE decision by simply amending
or repealing those aspects of their takeover laws that the Court had
found objectionable, leaving their statutes relatively unchanged.41 A
number of states, however, developed new methods for regulating take-
overs. For example, Ohio instituted a requirement that those seeking
acquisition of controlling blocks of shares receive an affirmative vote
36. Id. at 643.
37. Id. at 644. Justice White concluded that the Secretary's power to extend his reach beyond
the state's borders to block a nationwide tender offer constituted an indirect burden on interstate
commerce. He was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and
O'Connor. Justice Powell, however, was unable to join Part V-A of Justice White's opinion which
found that the Illinois Act directly burdened interstate commerce. Justice Powell, however, was
willing to join Part V-B because it left the state some room for regulating tender offers. A finding
that the Illinois Act directly burdened interstate commerce would have precluded this possibility.
Id. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice Powell found the case moot, but
was willing to consider the merits anyway. Id.
38. Id. at 634-39.
39. Id. at 637.
40. 457 U.S. at 655. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist found that the case was moot
and therefore were unwilling to reach the merits.
41. See Note, supra note 26, at 434 n.8. These revised state statutes have been referred to as
"second generation" takeover statutes. Id. at 434.
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from the shareholders before proceeding.42 Similarly, Maryland imposed
supermajority voting requirements43 and "fair price" amendments on
business combinations such as mergers." Likewise, Pennsylvania en-
acted provisions restricting the voting rights of "interested shareholders"
in certain corporate transactions such as mergers.45  The Pennsylvania
enactment also provided all disinterested shareholders with a right of re-
demption for their shares if a person or group were to acquire thirty
percent or more of the corporation's stock.46
All of the remaining states that have enacted new statutes tend to
follow either the Ohio, Maryland, or Pennsylvania approach. 47 The
MITE decision, however, set few clear standards for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of these new forms of legislation. As a result, it remained
uncertain as to whether these new forms of regulation would be pre-
empted by the Williams Act or alternatively fail to pass constitutional
muster on commerce clause grounds. Against this backdrop of doubt,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was faced with the question
of whether Indiana's new statute, The Control Share Acquisition Chap-
ter,48 which combines elements from all three of the above approaches,
was unconstitutional.
42. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, .11, .37, .48, .831, .832, 1707.01, .042, .23, .26, .99
(Baldwin 1985). The Sixth Circuit has recently found this statute unconstitutional on both
supremacy and commerce clause grounds. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135,
139 (6th Cir. 1986).
43. Supermajority refers to provisions which require that a substantial majority rather than
just, say 51%, approve an acquisition. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASSNS. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1985)
(at least 80% of the outstanding shares eligible to vote and at least two thirds of the voting shares
not owned by "interested shareholders" or by the affiliates).
44. Id.
45. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408(b), 1409.1(c)(l)-(3), 1910 (Purdon 1986).
46. Id.
47. See Note, supra note 26, at 434 n.8.
48. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1986). "This statute is part of a series of amendments
to the Indiana Business Corporation Law which were signed into law on March 4, 1986, and which
are to become effective August 1, 1987. IND. CODE § 23-1-17-3 (a). Section 23-1-17-3 (b) of the
statute, however, permits those corporations which so elect by resolution or [their] board of direc-
tors, to be governed by the statute as of April 1, 1986." On March 27, 1986, CTS, by resolution of
its board, elected to be covered by the statute for all tender offers made for CTS shares as of April 1,
1986. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Under this statute, shares acquired in a control share acquisition are stripped of their voting
rights unless the shareholders resolve otherwise. A "control share acquisition" is defined as the
acquisition by a single entity of shares which give it more than 20% of the voting power with respect
to shares in an "issuing corporation". IND. CODE § 23-1-42-2. An "issuing corporation" is defined
as a corporation that has (1) one hundred or more shareholders; (2) its principle place of business, its
principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana; and (3) either: (A) more than 10% of its share-
holders resident in Indiana; (B) more than 10% of its shares owned by Indiana residents; or
(C) 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. Id. § 23-1-42-4(a). In order to regain voting rights, a
tender offeror must have a resolution approved by (1) each voting group entitled to vote separately
by a majority of all votes entitled to be cast and (2) a majority of all votes entitled to be cast,
excluding all "interested shares." Id. § 23-1-42-9(b). "Interested shares" are defined as shares, the
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE AND REASONING OF THE COURT
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corp. of America (DCA) announced
its intention to make a partial tender offer for one million shares of CTS
Corp. (CTS) and to wage a proxy contest for control of CTS' Board.
49
In response to DCA's announcement, CTS adopted a shareholders'
rights plan, also known as a "poison pill.''5° Under this plan, each CTS
shareholder was entitled to purchase a unit of CTS securities at a price
equal to 25 percent of the then current market value. In addition to
adopting the "poison pill," CTS also chose to be covered by Indiana's
new tender offer statute, the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chap-
ter.5' Under the statute, the effectiveness of a tender offer is delayed for a
period of up to fifty days and the voting rights associated with each share
of the target company stock are altered.
52
Concurrent with announcing their intention to make a tender offer
for CTS, DCA sought a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of
both the CTS "poison pill" and the application of the Indiana Control
Share Acquisition Chapter. 53 On April 9, 1986, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined enforcement of
CTS' "poison pill" plan on the grounds that CTS' directors had violated
their fiduciary responsibilities. 54 In addition, the district court held that
the Indiana takeover statute was unconstitutional on both supremacy
and commerce clause grounds.5" The case was certified for immediate
appeal, and in an opinion written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed on both grounds. The court held that the Indiana statute im-
posed a greater delay on the tender offer than that mandated by the Wil-
liams Act and was therefore preempted by the supremacy clause.
voting of which, is controlled by an acquiring person, any officer of the corporation, and any em-
ployee of the corporation who is also a director of the corporation. Id. § 23-1-42-3.
Furthermore, the special meeting called for the purpose of considering the voting rights of the
acquired shares may be delayed up to 50 days but in any event must not be held sooner than 30 days
after the offeror's request for the meeting. Id.
49. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 55
U.S.L.W. 4478 (Apr. 21, 1987). At the time the offer was made, DCA already owned 9.6% of CTS'
common stock. If successful, the tender offer would have brought DCA's holdings up to 27.5% of
CTS common. 794 F.2d at 251.
50. Under CTS' "poison pill" plan, each CTS shareholder was to receive a dividend distribu-
tion of one "right" per common share. These "rights" were worthless unless any person or group
acquired 15% or more of CTS' common stock at which time the rights were to become nonredeem-
able, entitling the holders, other than the acquirer whose "rights" became null and void, to purchase
a unit of CTS securities at a price equal to 25% of the then current market value.
51. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1986).
52. See supra note 48.
53. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
54. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 253.
55. Id. at 251.
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Second, the court found that the Indiana statute violated the commerce
clause because it imposed substantial burdens on interstate commerce.
5 6
The first level of constitutional inquiry undertaken by the Seventh
Circuit was whether the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter was
preempted by the Williams Act and hence unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 57 Judge Posner began his analysis
by examining the legislative history of the Williams Act.58 In his view,
when Congress enacted the Williams Act, it attempted to strike a delicate
balance between the contending factions involved in the takeover contro-
versy. 59 Therefore, Judge Posner reasoned, the states were implicitly for-
bidden from adopting more hostile regulations, a conclusion supported
by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE.60 The court then
applied this reasoning to the Indiana statute and found that it forced
56. The court of appeals also sustained the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the poison pill. DCA proceeded with their tender offer for CTS common
ending up with 27.5% of the company. On the same day as the Seventh Circuit issued its decision,
CTS announced the adoption of a new "poison pill." The new "pill" was to become effective if any
shareholder obtained 28% of CTS. Each shareholder, other than the acquirer, would be entitled to
turn in their shares and receive in exchange a $50 debenture bond payable after one year with inter-
est at 10% per annum. The plan was to remain in effect for one year but could be cancelled by CTS'
board at any time. In addition, the "pill" would be automatically cancelled if anyone made a cash
offer for all the outstanding shares at a price of $50 or more. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 707.
DCA immediately filed suit in the district court seeking a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the new "poison pill." This time, however, the district judge denied the motion. Id.
The Seventh Circuit, however, vacated the denial and remanded for further factual findings. Id. at
718.
This second round of litigation between DCA and CTS is not pertinent to the constitutional
issues decided by the Seventh Circuit and addressed in this comment. The decision in the "second"
case raises some interesting questions regarding the proper application of the business judgment rule
in the context of corporate control transactions. See generally id. at 711-18 (the standard of review is
not gross negligence but "reasonableness"). But cf decisions of the Delaware courts discussed in
Wander & LeCoque, supra note 11, at 38-44 ("gross negligence" standard applied in Delaware).
57. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 260-63. The court also addressed some non-constitutional issues.
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had properly enjoined CTS' "poison
pill" plan on the grounds that CTS' directors had violated their fiduciary responsibilities. Judge
Posner reasoned that although defensive measures in general and "poison pills" in particular are
within the power of a board, in this case the directors of CTS had failed to evaluate the tender offer
in a cool, dispassionate and thorough fashion. Therefore, CTS' directors had failed to act in good
faith and in the best interests of the company. Id. at 257-59.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit held that although the district court had failed to comply with
28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) which requires the court to notify the attorney general of the State when the
constitutionality of a state statute is called into question, the violation was inadvertent and the preju-
dice to Indiana "nil." 794 F.2d at 260.
Finally, the court dismissed CTS' claim that if DCA's tender offer were to succeed, both compa-
nies would be in violation of § 8 of the Clayton Act which prohibits interlocking directorates. In the
court's view, the record of the case contained no persuasive evidence that DCA and CTS were in
competition or that any director of DCA would agree to serve as a CTS director. 794 F.2d at 265.
58. 794 F.2d at 262.
59. Id.
60. 457 U.S. 624 (1981).
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tender offers to remain open up to fifty days and therefore upset the bal-
ance struck by the Williams Act.61 Since this constituted a direct conflict
with the Williams Act provision of twenty days, the Indiana statute was
unconstitutional under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The second level of constitutional inquiry undertaken by the Sev-
enth Circuit was whether the Indiana statute was unconstitutional under
the commerce clause of the Constitution. Since the court had already
held the statute unconstitutional under the supremacy clause, Judge Pos-
ner found the question of the Indiana statute's validity under the com-
merce clause "doubly academic."' 62 Judge Posner nevertheless stated
that there was lingering doubt that the Williams Act was really intended
to preempt state regulation of tender offers. Therefore, he found it ap-
propriate to determine the Indiana statute's validity under the commerce
clause. 63 In the court's view, the question was answered by applying the
traditional balancing test enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 64 Spe-
cifically, the court proceeded to balance the burdens imposed on inter-
state commerce by the Indiana statute against its putative local benefits.
The court found it troubling that in order for CTS to take advantage of
the Indiana statute, only a small fraction of its shareholders had to reside
in Indiana. 65 In the Seventh Circuit's view, Indiana had no interest in
protecting residents of other states from "being stampeded" to tender
their shares to Dynamics. 66 Furthermore, the court rejected any notion
that Indiana's local interest in protecting employment and preventing the
shift of assets out of the state was enough to save the statute. The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the commerce clause does not allow states to
prevent corporations from moving assets and employees to other states. 67
As a result, the Seventh Circuit held that the burdens imposed on
interstate commerce by the Indiana statute outweighed any local interest
Indiana may have had in enacting the statute. Therefore, the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Chapter was unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution.
68
61. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 263. The court found the argument that the Indiana statute was less
inimical to tender offers than the Illinois Act struck down in MITE unpersuasive. "The Illinois
statute imposed both delay and put the acquirer at the mercy of the Illinois Secretary of State; the
Indiana statute imposes slightly greater delay but puts the acquirer at the tenderer mercies of the
'disinterested' shareholders. If we had to guess we would guess that the Indiana statute is less
inimical to the tender offer but that is unimportant." Id. at 262.
62. Id. at 263.
63. Id.
64. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
65. Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 263.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 264.
68. The court distinguished the decisions in L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 205-
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III. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Dynamics, like the Supreme
Court's holding in MITE, solves few of the questions raised by the state
regulation of tender offers. The first question left open by Dynamics is
whether Congress meant to preempt state regulation when they enacted
the Williams Act. In Dynamics, the Seventh Circuit held that the Indi-
ana statute was preempted by the Williams Act and therefore unconstitu-
tional on supremacy clause grounds. However, the Seventh Circuit
misread the Williams Act. The court construed the Act as requiring a
neutral balance of regulation between the offeror and target management
instead of as an investor protection act.
The second question left open by Dynamics is whether any state reg-
ulation of tender offers can surmount a commerce clause challenge. The
Seventh Circuit's decision that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional
on commerce clause grounds did not address whether the states have any
legitimate local interest in regulating tender offers that is incidental and
could outweigh the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.
A. Preemption of State Regulation
By operation of the supremacy clause federal law may preempt the
laws of any state.69 Little difficulty exists where Congress has explicitly
excluded the states from regulating. The problems come about when
congressional intent is unclear. 70 The Supreme Court has recognized
that there is no simple formula that can be used to determine when fed-
eral law preempts state regulation. "The policy of not lightly overturn-
ing state legislation is balanced against the countervailing policy of not
frustrating the Supremacy Clause."' 71 More often than not, the outcome
will turn on the Court's determination of legislative intent.
72
The Court has established a four step inquiry for determining
whether Congress intended to preempt state regulation of a particular
field. State legislation will be preempted where:
07 (6th Cir. 1985) and Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909-12 (8th Cir. 1984). 794
F.2d at 264. In Tyson, the Seventh Circuit noted, the Williams Act was not applicable and the
disclosures required by the state statute conferred greater benefits on local residents than the disclo-
sure required by the Indiana statute. Id. In Cardiff, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the required
disclosure was designed to give state residents information on the impact of a takeover and the delay
imposed was only slight. Id.
69. 457 U.S. at 630-31.
70. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317-18 (11th ed. 1985).
71. See Note, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance For an Old Battle-
ground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 758 (1982).
72. Id. (citing Note, Preemption and the Constitutionality of State Tender Offer Legislation, 54
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 725, 726 (1979)).
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(1) Congress has expressly provided;73
(2) the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplant it;74
(3) state law actually conflicts with the federal law; 75
(4) state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
76
The only explicit expression of Congressional intent regarding the
Williams Act is set forth in section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 which provides:
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities com-
mission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
77
The argument has been made that since Congress did not amend section
28(a) when it enacted the Williams Act, state regulation of tender offers
is not expressly preempted. 78 Interestingly, the Court in MITE pointed
out "there [was] no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of the state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act."' 79
The Seventh Circuit in Dynamics expressed no opinion on whether
it thought Congress had expressly preempted state regulation of tender
offers. 80 In addition, the court did not address the question of whether
the Williams Act presents a pervasive scheme of federal regulations. If a
negative answer to each question can be inferred from the court's silence,
then the court was correct. There are no explicit words in the Act, there-
fore Congress did not expressly preempt state regulation of tender offers.
Furthermore, the Williams Act does not present a pervasive scheme of
73. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
74. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. 190; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982). For example, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) the Court held
that absent a clear indication of congressional intent, it was reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of corporate law that deals with transfers of securities. Id. at 479. Similarly, in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court found it appropriate to relegate a defeated
tender offeror to those remedies available under state law in the absence of congressional intent to
create a federal remedy. Id. at 41.
75. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 523
(1912)).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
78. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1981). But see Boehm, State Interests and
Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 733, 749-50 (1979) (arguing that § 28(a) is irrelevant for determining whether the
Williams Act does or does not preempt state regulation).
79. 457 U.S. at 631 n.6.
80. Instead, the court focused its inquiry on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Mite as
well the Seventh Circuit's own decision in that case and found that "whatever doubts of the Williams
Act's preemptive intent we might entertain as an original matter [these doubts] are stilled by the
weight of precedent." Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 262.
THE TENDER BALANCE
federal regulation of tender offers. The Act merely requires disclosure to
shareholders of all material information relevant to a tender offer and
provides shareholders with substantive protections such as withdrawal
rights, pro rata acceptance and the equal treatment of all shareholders.
The Act does not change the cooperative nature of federal and state se-
curities regulation.
81
The Seventh Circuit's inquiry in Dynamics incorrectly centered on
whether the Indiana statute upset the balance struck by the Williams Act
between the offeror and target management.8 2 Judge Posner reasoned
that any state regulation which was more "hostile" to offerors than the
Williams Act would upset this balance and therefore be preempted. 83 He
concluded that the Indiana statute was preempted by the Williams Act
because it imposed a delay greater than that provided by the Act. Specif-
ically, under the Indiana statute, a target company could force a tender
offer to remain open up to fifty days; in contrast, the Williams Act re-
quires offers to remain open only twenty business days.84 Hence, the
Indiana statute tipped the balance of regulation in favor of the target
company, frustrating congressional intent to remain neutral between the
offeror and target management.
However, the Seventh Circuit misread the Williams Act. The
court's analysis should not have centered on whether the Indiana statute
tips the balance of regulation in favor of the offeror or target manage-
ment. The Williams Act was meant to be an "investor protection"Act.
In his explanation of the legislation, Senator Williams, the chief sponsor
of the Act, spoke of "closing a significant gap in investor protection.
8 5
The Act itself states that it is "designed to require full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of investors.86 Therefore, any neutrality as between the
81. But see Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitution-
ality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29 (1976) (suggesting that the Williams Act, together with the bal-
ance of the 1934 Act, comprises a comprehensive scheme of regulation of tender offers).
82. 794 F.2d at 262. The court never set out the preemption framework discussed earlier.
However, the court's discussion on the balance between target management and tender offeror seems
aimed at the fourth prong of the test, i.e. whether the Indiana statute stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
83. Id. "The reasoning is that Congress in the Williams Act (as in the federal labor laws)
struck a delicate balance between the contending factions in the takeover controversy and wanted its
balance to mean something and not be undone by the states." Id.
84. Id. at 263. "In any event, if the Williams Act is to be taken as a congressional determina-
tion that a month (roughly) is enough time to force a tender offer to be kept open, 50 days is too
much." Id.
85. See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967); see also Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-37
(1977) (discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act).
86. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 12, at 3; Note, supra note 26, at 435 (the Williams Act is
designed to protect investors); Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to
Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 872, 876 (1978)(the stated purpose of protecting investors).
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offeror and target management was but a by-product of legislation di-
rected toward a different purpose. 87 Accordingly, the proper inquiry
should have been whether the Indiana statute frustrated congressional
intent to protect investors.
Accepting that the Williams Act was meant to be an investor pro-
tection act,88 it seems inconsistent to find that a state regulation which
attempts to provide investors with greater protection frustrates the Act.
In fact, several observers have suggested that the Williams Act falls short
of its investor protection goal because it fails to provide investors and
management with adequate time to evaluate a tender offer. 9 Conse-
quently, state regulations which are more stringent than the Williams
Act should in theory provide greater investor protection and therefore
not frustrate any congressional objectives.
In fact, reconciling the apparent inconsistency depends on the
meaning ascribed to the term "investor protection." If "investor protec-
tion" means providing the individual shareholder with sufficient time and
information to reach his own decision, then providing additional time
and information would be consistent with investor protection. However,
if "investor protection" means a rule which maximizes shareholder
wealth, then more time and information may be harmful to the individ-
ual shareholder because any rule which requires additional time and in-
formation increases the costs of tender offers and therefore reduces the
likelihood that they will be made. 90 Consequently, the individual share-
holder is worse off since the reduced probability of a tender offer has
decreased his options for maximizing his wealth. As a result, any rule
which imposed time delays or disclosure beyond those required by the
Williams Act would not be protecting investors and therefore should be
preempted by the Williams Act. 91
The theory that shareholder wealth is maximized when the likeli-
hood of a tender offer is at its greatest seems to permeate Judge Posner's
reasoning and may explain his interpretation of the Williams Act. 92 It is
unlikely, however, that Congress had this theory in mind when they en-
87. Piper, 430 U.S. at 29. "Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests
for control. [However], neutrality is, rather but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a
different purpose-the protection of investors." Id.
88. There does not seem to be any disputing this conclusion. See generally S. REP. No. 550,
supra note 12; Piper, 430 U.S. at 29; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 634.
89. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 9; Arsht, supra note 29.
90. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding To A
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981).
91. This assumes a priori that the Williams Act provides for the minimum amount of delay and
information consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
92. Part IV will discuss this theory at greater length.
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acted the Williams Act. 93 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit was errone-
ous in holding that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter was
preempted by the Williams Act.
B. The Commerce Clause as a Restraint on State Regulation
It has long been held that the commerce clause,94 even without im-
plementing legislation from Congress, acts as a limitation upon state
power.95 The Supreme Court, however, has long recognized that the
commerce clause does not limit the power of the states to erect barriers
against interstate trade.96 A state statute that incidentally regulates in-
terstate commerce will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
97
The Seventh Circuit in Dynamics reasoned that all commerce clause
questions can be settled by merely balancing the benefit to the state's
residents against the burden to out-of-staters. 98 Judge Posner concluded
that the Indiana statute gravely impaired DCA's ability to do business
with CTS' shareholders. 99 Consequently, since Indiana had failed to es-
tablish any local benefit which outweighed the burdens imposed on inter-
state commerce, the Indiana statute was unconstitutional on commerce
clause grounds. oo
The Seventh Circuit was correct in finding that the Indiana Control
Share Acquisition Chapter was unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds. However, the court's analysis was cursory, and did not address
whether the states can ever assert a local interest in regulating tender
offers that is great enough to outweigh the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce. Proponents of state takeover regulation argue that the state
takeover statutes promote two legitimate local interests. First, protecting
93. Support for this conclusion is drawn from Professor Fischel's argument that the Williams
Act was designed to prevent shareholders from receiving an inadequate price for their stock. See
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1978). Professor Fischel's reasoning leads to the
conclusion that Congress was not thinking in terms of protecting shareholders as a whole, but only
particular shareholders involved in a tender offer.
94. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
power ... to regulate commerce ... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
95. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
96. Raymond Motors Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that the limitations imposed on the states by the commerce clause were not absolute.
"(F]or example, a state may apply its health and safety regulation to imported goods even though the
cost of compliance will be borne in part by people in other states, and the suppliers of the goods."
Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 263.
97. 794 F.2d at 263.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 263-64.
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target shareholders and second, regulating the internal affairs of domestic
corporations under state law. 01 Both of these asserted interests, how-
ever, fail to outweigh the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.
Although the first local interest, the protection of local investors, is
plainly a legitimate state objective, tender offer laws have global impact
and could reach shareholders in every state. As the Supreme Court rec-
ognized, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders. 0 2 In reality, the state is using the notion of "investor pro-
tection" as a euphemism for the protection of local economic interests.
0 3
Statutes which protect local interests at the expense of out-of-state busi-
ness run the risk of creating preferential trade areas destructive of the
free trade which the commerce clause was designed to protect.'
4
The second legitimate interest asserted by proponents of state take-
over legislation, regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorpo-
rated under the state law, is also not a legitimate reason for the
regulation of tender offers by the states.10 5 The regulation of internal
corporate affairs is meant to protect shareholders by imposing obligations
on the corporation, its officers or controlling persons in their dealings
with the shareholders. Tender offers, on the other hand, contemplate
transfers of stock by shareholders to a third party and do not themselves
implicate the internal affairs of the target company.
10 6
Consequently, it is unlikely that any state regulation of tender offers
will surmount a commerce clause challenge. 107 In fact, the whole area of
tender offer regulation should be reexamined by Congress. As one com-
mentator has noted, "considering the controversial nature of this area
and the interests involved, it appears that a clearer statement of Congres-
101. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV., 722, 740-46 (1970).
102. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644.
103. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 622.
104. Boston Stock Exch. v. Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (citing Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)).
105. The Supreme Court agreed with this conclusion in Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
106. 457 U.S. at 645. The internal affairs argument is even less persuasive given the fact that
today many companies incorporate in a particular state to take advantage of its tax laws and have no
other contact with the state. This last point raises the question of whether it still makes sense for the
states to regulate corporate conduct. A discussion of this point, however, is beyond the scope of this
comment.
107. In fact, none of the "second generation" statutes that have been challenged have survived
judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135, 139 (6th Cir.
1986)(Ohio statute unconstitutional under supremacy and commerce clause); Terry v. Yamashita,
643 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. Haw. 1986)(Hawaii statute unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp, 1400, 1414-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(Missouri statute held invalid
under both supremacy and commerce clauses); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 1216, 1220-24 (D. Minn. 1985)(Minnesota statute held invalid because of its substantial direct
burdens on interstate commerce).
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sional intent is needed.108
IV. PROTECTING INVESTORS By MAXIMIZING
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
The theory of wealth maximization may explain why the Seventh
Circuit centered its attention on the tender offeror (DCA) and the target
company (CTS) when they found that the Williams Act preempted the
Indiana statute. Judge Posner has long advocated using this theory in
judicial decision making.'0 9 Although his application of economic the-
ory in general, and wealth maximization in particular, to legal problems
has generated a great deal of commentary and criticism, 10 the theory is
well suited for analyzing the effects of regulation on tender offers. II
The theory of wealth maximization posits that the most efficient al-
location of resources is that which makes the economic pie as large as
possible, regardless of the relative size of the slices. 1 2 In the context of
the securities market, wealth maximization means allocating resources in
a manner that increases the returns to shareholders as a whole rather
than any one particular shareholder.' ' 3 The latter implies that the pur-
pose of tender offer regulation, in particular, should be to improve the
economic functioning of the capital markets to achieve better resource
allocation.
Resources are allocated efficiently in the capital market when the
prices of all traded securities accurately and promptly reflect the securi-
ties' intrinsic values relative to all publicly available information about
108. See Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and Takeover Statutes: New Importancefor
an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 691, 776 (1982); see also Greene, Recent Tender Offer Develop-
ments: On The Edge or Deep In?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 722 (1984)(current regulatory scheme does
not respond to modem realities of tender offers).
109. See Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
131 (1984).
110. See, e.g., Samuels & Mercurio, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 107 (1984); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985)(criticizing Professor Easterbrook's application of his wealth maximiza-
tion theory); Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the
Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1985).
111. Unlike the questions of personal liberties, where concerns for efficiency and efficacy may
overlook higher values protected by the Bill of Rights, the area of tender offer regulation is closely
related to that area generaly associated with economic analysis.
112. See Posner, supra note 109, at 132.
113. The return to an individual shareholder is a function of the company's dividend policy plus
any appreciation in price of the firm's stock. The probability of earning a return is influenced by the
degree of risk inherent in the particular investment. All things equal, the greater the risk in a given
investment, the greater the return demanded by the shareholder. From the perspective of sharehold-
ers as a whole, wealth is maximized when resources are allocated to their highest and best use given
a certain level of risk.
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the corporation. 1 4 One of the most important pieces of information
which influences the public's perception of the firm is the ability of the
corporation's management. 1 5 If a firm is well managed, the price of its
securities will be higher than under less competent management. In con-
trast, if the firm is poorly managed, the price of its securities will be lower
than under more competent management.11 6 In the latter case, the firm
and society will benefit from a transfer of control from the current man-
agement to more capable management. The existence, however, of a se-
curities market which is informationally efficient regarding the quality of
the firm's management, does not mean that poorly performing manage-
ment will be replaced swiftly.
In order for the capital market to function efficiently, there must be
a mechanism that creates an incentive for management to maximize the
welfare of its shareholders. 1 7 Since a successful takeover bid usually re-
sults in the displacement of current management, tender offers provide a
strong incentive to corporate managers to operate efficiently and keep
share prices high. 18 There are various methods of transferring corporate
control. 1 9 The cash tender offer, however, is the means most favored by
potential acquirers. 120 Accordingly, since tender offers provide a mecha-
nism for maximizing shareholder wealth, the goal of any tender offer reg-
ulation should be to maximize the probability of a tender offer being
made.
The stated goal of the Williams Act, as well as the various state
statutes, has been to protect investors.1 21 Although the concept of "in-
vestor protection" is nebulous, what the various legislators had in mind
was more likely a system of regulation which insured that an individual
shareholder in a given tender offer receive the highest price for his
stock.122 In general, the Act and its various state counterparts impose
114. This is known as the "efficient capital market theory." See Fischel, supra note 93, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1-2.
117. Professor Fischel has referred to the shifting of corporate assets from one group of manag-
ers to another group who can employ them more profitably as the "market for corporate control."
Id. at 2.
118. Id. at 9. Professor Fischel notes that while "theoretically, shareholders may oust poor
management on their own initiative, the costs to such shareholders . . . [are] prohibitive." Id.
119. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
120. As noted earlier, tender offers are cheaper and faster than either proxy solicitations or ex-
change offers. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
122. Support for this conclusion can be gleaned from studying the provisions of the Act and its
various state counterparts. Professor Fischel notes that the Williams Act was intended to protect
shareholders, the greatest risk being that a shareholder will sell his shares for an inadequate price.
However, the term "inadequate" has two distinct meanings. First, that the tender offer price is less
than the intrinsic value of the shares at the time of sale. Second, a tender price could be inadequate
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delay on the tender offer process for the purpose of giving shareholders
the time to make an informed decision.1 23 A by-product of the delay is
to cause competing bidders to surface who are willing to pay a greater
premium than that originally offered. Therefore, under this theory,
shareholders are protected by being able to sell to a higher bidder.
124
The weakness in this theory is that it fails to recognize that although
delay may lead to a higher price for the firm's shares, shareholders as a
whole do not necessarily benefit from this. This is because the value of
any stock to the shareholders as a whole is comprised of the sum of two
components: the price that will prevail in the market if there is no suc-
cessful offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none) and the
price that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likeli-
hood that some offer will succeed).125 A shareholder's welfare is maxi-
mized when the sum of these components reaches its highest value.
However, since the delay brought about by the various tender offer regu-
lations increases the premium that must be paid for the stock, the usual
interaction of supply and demand mean that fewer tender offers will be
made. 126
Although a higher premium is paid, the higher bid is not in accord-
ance with the theory of wealth maximization. While the target share-
holders receive a higher price, the gains are being exactly offset by the
if the shareholder could somehow receive a still higher price. But, as Fischel reasons, the Act is not
concerned with inadequacy in the first sense since there is little danger that shareholders will get less
than their shares are worth if they receive a premium above the market. Therefore, the Act is
designed to protect against inadequacy in the second sense. See Fischel, supra note 93, at 25.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 16-27. In addition to giving the individual shareholder
time to make an informed decision, the delay imposed by the Act and its state counterparts facili-
tates management's search for a "white knight" or gives them time to engage in a variety of defensive
tactics. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 90, at 1161-62.
124. The empirical evidence supports a conclusion that the delay brought on by the Act and the
various state regulations increases the premiums paid to acquire target companies. According to a
study done by Jarrell and Bradley, the premiums paid to target companies increased from 32% over
market price to 53% following the enactment of the Williams Act. The effect of the state laws has
been to increase the premium to over 73%. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal
and State Regulation Of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371, 373 (1980).
125. The premise that the value of any stock is comprised of the two components discussed
above was originally developed by Judge Easterbrook (then a professor) and Professor Fischel in
their work on the proper role of target management in the face of a tender offer. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 90, at 1161. In this article, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that
management should be passive in the face of a tender offer, Le., adopt no defensive measures
designed to defeat the offer. Their conclusion is based on the reasoning that defensive measures
increase the cost of a tender offer and thereby decrease the likelihood that one will be made. As a
result, shareholders as a whole are worse off. Id. at 1164.
126. This conclusion is based on the premise that demand curves slope downward, i.e., as price
rises, the quantity demanded falls. It should be noted that the scope of this section is assessing only
one of the variables discussed. Specifically, the probability that a tender offer will be made. Further-
more, it is being assumed that the percentage change in the probability that an offer will be made is
greater than the percentage increase in price.
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bidders' payment. Thus, the higher premium is really a tax on the of-
feror's shareholders. Therefore, shareholders as a group gain nothing. 127
Furthermore, if all the gains from the prospect of a properly managed
firm go to the target shareholders, then no one will have any incentive to
make a tender offer.12
8
Consequently, the Williams Act and its state counterparts limit the
number of tender offers that will be made. At a minimum, Congress
should act to preempt state regulation of tender offers because they im-
pose the greatest threat to the goal of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion. 129 The state statutes usually impose greater delays on tender offers
than the Act.130 In addition, a significant amount of time and money is
wasted litigating the legality of the state statutes. With few exceptions,
none of the state regulations have ever withstood constitutional muster.
Finally, it is inefficient to impose fifty different state regulations on trans-
actions that run in the billions of dollars, criss-crossing the country, and
sometimes the globe.
CONCLUSION
Although the Seventh Circuit reached the correct result in Dynam-
ics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. ,131 the court's opinion solved few of the
pressing questions raised by state regulation of tender offers. The court
incorrectly construed the Williams Act as requiring evenhanded regula-
tion between the tender offeror and the target company. However, the
Williams Act was meant to protect investors. Any neutral effect between
the offeror and the target company is but a by-product of legislation
aimed at a different purpose. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was errone-
127. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 90, at 1175
128. Id. at 1177.
129. Professor Fischel goes a step farther by concluding that in addition to the state statutes, the
Williams Act serves no valid purpose. See Fischel, supra note 93, at 45. Although Congress may
ultimately agree with him with respect to the state statutes, it is unlikely that they will remove any of
the impediments imposed by the Williams Act. In fact, the attitude of Congress seems to be in just
the other direction. For example, one of the changes to the tax code brought about by the "Tax
Reform Act of 1986" is the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. See Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Law and Controlling Committee Reports (CCH) 7631, at 1137. Under the General Utilities doc-
trine, an acquirer had been able to purchase the assets of a liquidating corporation or a deemed
liquidation, and obtain a basis in the assets equal to their fair market value without the transferor
recognizing any gain. However, the new tax law repeals the General Utilities doctrine by requiring
the recognition of gain or loss on any liquidation or deemed liquidation. Id.
In addition, the recent insider trading scandal may cause the SEC or even Congress to impose
restrictions on takeover activity. See Bianco & Farrel, How the Boesky Bombshell is Rocking Wall
Street, Bus. WK. Dec. 1, 1986, 31, 31-33.
130. As illustrated earlier, the Indiana statute delayed the effectiveness of a tender offer for up to
50 days. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
131. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4478 (Apr. 21, 1987).
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ous in holding that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter was
unconstitutional on supremacy clause grounds.
Furthermore, even though the court was correct in finding that the
Indiana statute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce, the court's
decision did not address the question of whether the states can assert any
legitimate interest in regulating tender offers that outweighs the burden
imposed on interstate commerce. Although the court is silent, the an-
swer seems to be no. Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by
shareholders to a third party and therefore do not implicate matters that
are traditionally the subject of state corporate law.
A possible explanation for the court's construction of the Williams
Act is the theory of wealth maximization. Judge Posner has often advo-
cated using this theory in judicial decision making. In the context of
tender offer regulation, the theory of wealth maximization requires legal
rules which encourage rather than discourage tender offers. Since state
regulations impose significant burdens on tender offers, Congress should
act to preempt state regulations.
APPENDIX
On April 21, 1987, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's finding that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter was
unconstitutional. 13 2 Justice Powell, 1 33 writing for a majority of the
Court, reasoned that the Indiana act differed from the Illinois statute
considered in Edgar v. MITE. 134 Whereas the Illinois statute operated to
favor management against offerors, the Indiana act protected individual
shareholders against both the offeror and target management.1 35 Justice
Powell reasoned that by allowing shareholders to evaluate the fairness of
a tender offer collectively, the Indiana act furthered the Williams Act
goal of shareholder protection.1 36 As a result, the Court concluded that
the Indiana act did not conflict with the Williams Act and was not,
therefore, preempted by the supremacy clause.' 37
132. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 55 U.S.L.W. 4478, 4480 (Apr. 21, 1987).
133. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall and
O'Connor. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion.
134. See discussion of case supra at 1005-06.
135. CTS Corp., 55 U.S.L.W. at 4481. Justice Powell reasoned that the Indiana act had none of
the defects found to exist in the Illinois statute. The Indiana act, unlike the Illinois statute did not
require precommencement notice, did not delay indefinitely a tender offer, and did not allow the
fairness of tender offers to be reviewed by a state official. Id. at 4481.
136. Id.
137. The Court also rejected Dynamics' argument that the Indiana act imposed an absolute 50
day delay on tender offers and was therefore in conflict with the 20 business day period established
by the SEC under the Williams Act. Justice Powell reasoned that only an unreasonable delay would
make the statute constitutionally infirm. Furthermore, in the Court's view, the Indiana act did not
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The Court also rejected the Seventh Circuit's holding that the Indi-
ana Control Share Acquisition Chapter unduly burdened interstate com-
merce. Justice Powell reasoned that the Seventh Circuit had "failed to
appreciate the significance for commerce clause analysis of the fact that
state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose
very existence and attributes are a product of state law."' 138 He noted
that it was "an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for
States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares."13 9
Consequently the Court concluded that Indiana had an interest in
promoting a stable relationship among shareholders and the corporation
as well as protecting shareholders from tender offers that may coerce
them into tendering their shares.t40 The Court rejected Dynamic's argu-
ment that "the prospect of coercive tender offers is illusory and that
tender offers generally should be favored because they reallocate corpo-
rate assets into the hands of management who can use them most effec-
tively."1 41 Justice Powell responded that "[t]he Constitution does not
require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory"1 42 stat-
ing that the Court was "not inclined to 'second guess the empirical judge-
ment of lawmakers'."'
143
Finally, the Court found unconvincing Dynamic's argument that
the Indiana act was unconstitutional because it would ultimately limit
the number of successful tender offers. In the Court's view, the Indiana
act provided only regulatory procedures designed for the better protec-
tion of corporate shareholders. t'"
Although an analysis of the Court's decision is beyond the scope of
this paper, a few points bear mentioning. First, as both Justice White
impose an absolute 50 day delay since an offeror was not precluded from purchasing shares as soon
as permitted by federal law. Id. at 4482.
138. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4483.
139. Id. at 4484.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Justice Powell noted that the potentially coercive aspects of tender offers had been
recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as by a number of scholarly com-
mentators. Id.
143. Id. The Court also rejected Dynamics' argument that Indiana had no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders. Justice Powell agreed that while Indiana has "no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations (the Indiana] act applies only to
corporations incorporated in Indiana. Id.
144. Justice Scalia concurred, reasoning that a law can be both economic folly and constitu-
tional. Id. at 4485. Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens dissented. In their view, the problem
with the Indiana act was that while it protected the interests of a majority of the shareholders, in
many instances, it would effectively prevent an individual investor from selling his stock at a pre-
mium. Id.
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and Judge Posner noted, it is unlikely that anyone will make a tender
offer if they risk losing the voting rights on the shares. Moreover, not
only may a company deny a shareholder the right to vote in a takeover
contest, but the right to vote may be permanently denied.1 45 In addition,
if the Indiana act was really a shareholder protection act, it is interesting
that a corporation may opt out of its statutory provisions.146
Second, the Court seems all too willing to defer to the state's judg-
ment because corporations are creations of the state. This view, how-
ever, fails to recognize the reality of today's financial markets. By
allowing state regulation of tender offers, the Court is running the risk of
creating preferential trade areas destructive of the free trade envisioned
by the commerce clause. In reality, the purpose and effect of the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Chapter is not to protect shareholders, but to
entrench management at the shareholders' expense. 147
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145. Id. at 4479.
146. See IND. CODE § 23-1-42-5.
147. In its brief before the Court, the State of Indiana admitted that at least one of its goals was
to protect Indiana Corporations. See CTS Corp., 55 U.S.L.W. at 4486 (White, J., dissenting). For
evidence that state tender offer regulation harms rather than protects shareholders, see recent SEC
study of the Ohio act which showed stock prices declined an average of 2% following enactment of
the law.

